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VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET PREVAILS (FOR NOW)
OVER VICTORIA'S SECRET: THE SUPREME COURT
REQUIRES PROOF OF ACTUAL DILUTION UNDER
THE FTDA
Sue Ann Mota t
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a split in
the circuits, unanimously holding that the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act (FTDA) requires an "actual proof of dilution," instead of a
"likelihood of dilution," standard.1 Thus, in the U.S. Supreme Court
case of Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., a lingerie and adult toy
store, formerly called Victor's Secret, prevailed over the well-known
Victoria's Secret lingerie empire.2 The Court's rationale was that
Victoria's Secret has not yet proven that Victor's Little Secret
actually diluted the Victoria's Secret famous mark under the FTDA.3
This Case Note examines the FTDA and the Victor's/Victoria's
litigation, analyzes the first Supreme Court decision on the FTDA,
and makes predictions and recommendations for future FTDA
litigants.
II. FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995
U.S. trademark law had its origins in English common law and
was codified in the Trademark Act of 1946, the Lanham Act.4
Trademark infringement law protects consumers from being misled
t Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of
Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif, M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State University.




4. Id. at *16-17 (citing B. PATrISHALL, D. HILLIARD, AND J. WELCH, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 2 (41h ed. 2000)).
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by infringing marks.5 Trademark dilution law, however, neither had
its origins in the common law nor its focus on the likelihood of
consumer confusion; rather, it developed from a 1927 Harvard Law
Review article that focused on the protection of the uniqueness of the
owner's mark.6
Massachusetts was the first state to enact a trademark dilution
statute, and by the time the FTDA was enacted, at least twenty-five
states had trademark dilution acts. 7  This led to forum-shopping,
increased litigation, inconsistent court decisions, and a lack of
nationwide injunctions.8
The FTDA was first considered in 1988, but was rejected by
Congress due to First Amendment concerns. 9 The FTDA was
reintroduced in 1995, containing two provisions to overcome the First
Amendment concerns: a fair use exception, which allows the use of
the mark in comparative ads, and a provision that a non-commercial
use is not infringement.' 0
The FTDA's purpose, according to Congress, is to "protect
famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness
of the mark, or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a
likelihood of consumer confusion.""1 Under the FTDA, dilution is
defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
or distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of competition between the owner of the famous mark and other
parties, or likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."' 2
Its legislative history reveals that the FTDA was not intended to
preempt state law.' 3 In addition, according to Congress, the FTDA is
consistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which is part of the GATT
5. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *17 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)).
6. Frank Schecter, Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 831
(1927) (referring to a German case protecting the owner of a well-known trademark for
mouthwash from use by steel producers).
7. 1947 Mass. Acts 307. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *20.
8. H. REP. No. 374, 10 4
th Cong., I ' Sess. 5 (1995).
9. H. REP. No. 1028, 100 th Cong., I' Sess. 1 (1988).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(4) (2002).
11. H. REP. No. 374, 10 4 '
h Cong., I' Sess. 5 (1995).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002). Specific examples of uses that would tarnish or blur a
famous mark would include Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, or Kodak pianos. H. REP. No. 374,
1 0 4
th Cong., I' Sess. 5 (1995).
13. H. REP. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1V Sess. 6 (1995).
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Agreement. t4  Thus, the FTDA was enacted as law, allowing the
owner of a famous mark to obtain an injunction when another makes
a commercial use of that mark or trade name and there is evidence
that the distinctive quality of the mark had been diluted.' 5  The
following non-exclusive list of factors may be considered by a court
to determine whether a mark is distinctive and famous: the
distinctiveness of the mark; the duration and extent of the use of the
mark; the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark; the geographical trading area in which the mark is used; the
channels of trade for the goods or services for which the mark is used;
the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by both parties; the nature and extent of use of
the same or similar marks by third parties; and whether the mark was
registered on the principal register.' 6 The FTDA grants exceptions for
news reporting and commentary, noncommercial use of the mark, and
fair use for comparative advertising or promotion. 17
14. Id. See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, annex IC, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/27-trips.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2003),
which stated:
Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutates mutandis, to
goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark
is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those goods or
services would indicate a connection between those goods or services and the
owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner of
the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2002), Remedies for dilution of famous marks:
... [t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if
such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court
may consider factors such as, but not limited to - (A) the degree of inherent or
acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the
mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C)
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the
geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the
channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G)
the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H)
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. Id.
16. Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(4) (2002).
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III. MOSLEY V. VSECRET CATALOGUE, INC.
The "Victoria's Secret" mark has been registered with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office since 1981, is owned by V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., and the mark is currently licensed to Victoria's Secret
Stores and Victoria's Secret Catalogue.' 8 Victoria's Secret sells a
complete line of lingerie, clothing, and accessories in over 750 stores
and on the Internet. Victoria's Secret Catalogue distributes 400
million copies of the catalogue each year.' 9
In 1998, defendants Victor and Cathy Moseley opened "Victor's
Secret," a store in a strip mall in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, selling
men's and women's lingerie, adult videos, sex toys, and other items.20
Two Victoria's Secret stores were located within sixty miles of
Elizabethtown, opening in 1982 and 1985, respectively. 2' In 1998,
39,000 copies of the Victoria's Secret catalog were distributed in
Elizabethtown, which in 1990 had a population of nearly 33,000 in
the county subdivision. 22 In 1998, Victoria's Secret spent over $55
million on advertising, and has recently been ranked the ninth most
famous brand in the apparel industry.
23
The defendants, however, claimed that they were not aware of
Victoria's Secret stores or catalog until they received a cease and
desist letter from Victoria's Secret in 1998.24 Victor and Cathy
Moseley then changed the name of their store to "Victor's Little
Secret," with the word "Little" in smaller font and above the other
two words.2 5
Victoria's Secret filed suit against the defendants in federal
district court, claiming federal trademark infringement, unfair
competition under the federal Trademark Act, violation of the FTDA,
and common law trademark infringement and unfair competition.26
18. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6"' Cir. 2001), rev'd, No. 01-
1015, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *1 (2003).
19. Id.
20. Moseley, 259 F.3d at 466.
21. Id.
22. U.S. Gazetteer, U.S. Census Bureau, available at www.census.gov (last visited Mar.
6, 2003). The city of Elizabethtown had a population of just over 18,000 in 1990. Id.
23. Moseley, 259 F.3d at 466. In 1998, Victoria's Secret's sales exceeded $1.5 billion.
Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *7.
24. Moseley, 259 F. 3d at 466-67. Victoria's Secret became aware of Victor's Secret
when an offended Army colonel contacted Victoria's Secret. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945,
at *I.
25. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at * 1.
26. Moseley, 259 F.3d at 467.
MOSELEY V. V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.27
The district court granted the Moseleys' motion for summary
judgment on the federal trademark infringement laws because
Victoria's Secret did not present evidence sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact that a likelihood of confusion existed
between the two marks.28 Victoria's Secret did not appeal this
decision.29  The district court granted the motion for summary
judgment on Victoria's Secret's FTDA claim, reasoning that "dilution
can occur even where the products are not in competition and no
likelihood of confusion is possible. 30  The district court found
Victoria's Secret's mark to be both blurred and tarnished.3' In
response to the district court's injunction, the Moseleys changed the
store's name to "Cathy's Little Secret" and then appealed to the
controlling appellate court.32
Two months after the lower court's decision, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted the Second Circuit's standard for dilution.
33
While the district court in Moseley had applied a four-factor test for
dilution, the Second Circuit applied a five-factor test.34 The district
court required the plaintiff to prove that i) the mark is famous; ii) the
defendants were making a commercial use of the mark; iii) the
defendants' use began after the mark became famous; and iv) the
defendants' use of the mark diluted the quality of the mark by
diminishing the mark's strength as the identifier of the goods and
services.35  The Second Circuit's test, set out in Nabisco,
Incorporated v. PF Brands, Inc., requires the plaintiff in a dilution
claim establish that i) they have a senior mark; ii) the mark was both
famous and distinctive; iii) the junior use is a commercial use; iv) use
began after the senior mark became famous; and v) use caused
dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark.36 The Sixth
Circuit had previously adopted the Nabisco standard in Kellogg Co. v.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 466.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 467.
32. Moseley 259 F.3d at 466, 468.
33. Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (6h Cir. 2000).
34. Moseley, 259 F.3d at 469. See also Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208
(2d Cir. 1999).
35. Moseley, 259 F.3d at 469 (citing Panavision Int'l., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1324 (9 h Cir. 1998)).
36. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
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Exxon Corp. in 2000. 37 The following year, the Sixth Circuit again
applied this standard in Moseley.38 Finding the district court's four-
factor test to be "substantially similar" to the five-prong test adopted
by the Sixth Circuit, the appellate court affirmed.39 In addition, the
appellate court found the Victoria's Secret mark to be "quite
distinctive" and deserved a high degree of trademark protection. The
court had "little doubt" that the average lingerie customer would
associate the two marks, thus tarnishing and blurring the senior
mark.4 °
The Sixth Circuit discussed the test adopted by the Fourth
Circuit in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development in 1999. 41 The Fourth Circuit
held that dilution required a sufficient similarity of marks to evoke in
consumers a mental association of the two that causes actual harm to
the senior mark's economic value as a product identifying and
advertising agent.42  Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit stated that this
"actual harm" test does not "leap" from the statute, but lies in the
legislative history.4 3 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
also adopted an "actual harm" standard, as applied in its 2000
decision in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holding, Inc.44  The
Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's actual harm
test, and the Sixth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's test; the result
being a split in the circuits and a stage set for Supreme Court
review.45
37. Kellogg, 209 F.2d at 562.
38. Moseley, 259 F.3d at 469.
39. Id. at 466, 469. The only difference is that the appellate court's test requires the
plaintiff to prove the mark is not only famous but also distinctive. Id. at 469. Although the
district court applied a slightly different test, the district court would have "undoubtedly"
reached the same conclusion under the five-factor test. Id. at 470.
40. Id. at 476-77. The appellate court continued, "[t]his, then is a classic instance of
dilution (associating the Victoria's Secret name with sex toys and lewd coffee mugs) and by
blurring (linking the chain with a single unauthorized establishment)." Id. at 477.
41. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v. Utah Division of Travel
Development, 170 F.3d 449, 453 (4 h Cir. 1999).
42. Id.
43. Id. See generally Jeffrey Enright, Slow Death of a Salesman: The Watering Down of
Dilution Viability by Demanding Proof of Actual Economic Loss, 77 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 937
(2002).
44. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holding, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5 th Cir. 2000).
45. See supra notes 36-39. See generally Jennifer Hemerly, The "Secret of Our
Success:" The Sixth Circuit Interprets the Proof Requirement Under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act in V Secret Catalogue v. Moseley, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 321 (2002);
Daniel H. Lee, , Remedying Past and Future Harm: Reconciling Conflicting Circuit Court
Decisions Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 689 (2002).
MOSELEY V. V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a famous
mark was necessary for relief under the FTDA.46  An unanimous
Supreme Court decided that a showing of actual injury is necessary.4 7
Examining the FTDA, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated
that the owner of a famous mark is entitled to injunctive relief against
another's commercial use of a mark or trade name if that use "causes
dilution" of the distinctive qualities.48 The Victoria's Secret mark is
"unquestionably valuable," and the petitioners did not challenge that
it was a famous mark. 49 The question before the Court, though, was
whether the use of the junior mark caused dilution of the distinctive
quality of the famous mark.50 The Court concluded that the text of
the statute unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution,
rather than a "likelihood" of dilution, as used in state statutes and the
Lanham Act. 51 Dilution is defined as "lessening the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless
of the presence or absence of competition between the parties or
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception., 52 Thus, for an owner
of a famous mark to prevail, the Court requires actual dilution, but not
necessarily consequences of dilution.53 The consumers' mental
association is not enough.54 The Court stated that direct evidence of
dilution, such as consumer surveys, which may be expensive,
unreliable, or difficult to obtain, are not necessary if actual dilution
may be proven through reliable circumstantial evidence, such as
where the marks are identical.55  Thus, the Court reversed the
summary judgment and remanded the case. 56
Justice Kennedy concurred, with a few astute observations.57
46. Moseley et al. v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 535 U.S. 985 (2002).
47. Moseley, 2003 U.S. Lexis 1945, at *27.
48. Id. at *24 (citing 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(1) (2000). Justice Scalia did not join in Part III
of the opinion, which dealt with the legislative history. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *5.
49. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *22.
50. Id. at *24.
51. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2002).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002).
53. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *24. The Court thus distinguished the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d 449, which went further. Moseley, 2003 U.S.
LEXIS 1945, at *25.
54. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *25-27. The army colonel's mental association
does not satisfy the actual harm requirement. See supra note 24.
55. Id. at *26-27.
56. Id. at *27.
57. Id.
2003]
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Justice Kennedy urged that the evidentiary showing required by the
statute be clarified on remand.58  When conducting this inquiry,
however, Kennedy stated that considerate attention should be placed
on the word "capacity" in the definition of dilution-as in "lessening
the capacity" of the famous mark to identify and distinguish goods
and services.59 Since equitable principles encourage those who are
injured to assert their rights promptly, the owner of a famous mark
should not have to wait until actual harm is done.60 Judge Kennedy
further states in his concurrence that diminishment of the famous
mark's capacity thus can be shown from the probable consequences
flowing from the use of the competing mark.61
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in its first, but surely not its last,
case on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., deciding that the FTDA requires a showing of actual
dilution of the famous mark, not just a likelihood of dilution, thus,
resolving a split in the circuits.6 2 On remand, Victoria's Secret will
have the opportunity to show actual harm, either through direct or
circumstantial evidence, and may ultimately prevail in this dispute. 63
In light of this decision, plaintiffs in future FTDA actions must go to
court armed with reliable evidence of actual dilution of the famous
mark in order to prevail under the FTDA.
Even though Justice Kennedy's observations appear in a
concurrence, his arguments have sound base.64 An FTDA plaintiff
should not have to wait until there is actual harm, but should be able
to show "diminishment of the capacity" of the mark by showing
probable negative consequences attributable to the competing mark.
Plaintiffs must act quickly to gather evidence of actual harm to a
famous mark through dilution, yet, as Justice Kennedy rightly points
out, courts should be willing to also consider evidence of a "lessening
the capacity" of that famous mark to serve its purpose as an identifier.
58. Id. at *27.
59. Id. at *28. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60. Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945, at *29.
61. Id.
62. Id. See also supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. See also Moseley, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1945,
at *29-30 (Justice Kennedy, concurring), which states, "The Court's opinion does not foreclose
injunctive relief if respondents on remand present sufficient evidence of either blurring or
tarnishment." Id.
64. See id.
